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The Phenomenology of Addiction: Where there is Wille 2
Systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason cannot reach a final goal or give an entirely satisfactory explanation to phenomena because it is bound by the mere relations of appearances to another. The recognition of such an obvious fact has been obscured by the religion of Scientism operated collectively by so-called intellectuals and even scientists of our age. It has manufactured the fantastic world where all of Science has devolved into farcical attempts at explaining what is directly given to us from what is given indirectly. This is why the aim and indeed the ideal of Science is a materialism wholly carried into effect.
It is pertinent at this point to understand the role of the intellect vis-à-vis the Wille. The intellect is conditioned by the brain to respond adequately to the whims of the Wille. Keep in mind that the brain itself is simply the objectivity of the Thing-in-Itself, which for us, is the Wille; for the intellect generally turns out to be what is secondary and subordinate to it. In self-consciousness the Wille appears as the primary and immediate thing to always assert its pre-eminence over the intellect. This Wille is not essentially united with Consciousness, but is related to it, in other words, to knowledge, similarly as something illuminated to light. It comes into consciousness from within just as the corporeal world comes from without. The Intellect is as fleeting and is as perishable as is the brain, and is its activity foremost. Like the whole organism, the brain is the phenomenon, therefore a secondary thing of the Wille. Only the Wille is truly imperishable but in itself is without consciousness; the Wille is metaphysical, the intellect physical.
Consciousness itself is conditioned by the intellect, which is but an accident of our being, and acts as the primary function of the brain. The brain in all its complexity serves only the purpose of self-preservation by regulating the body's relations with the external world. Indeed this way the brain is in fact like a parasite attached to its host, where as the image brought about by its forms of knowledge is said to be extended and operative. The apprehension of the external world, thus, self-consciousness contains a knower and a known else consciousness of anything would not be possible. The knower himself, precisely so, cannot be known because he would otherwise be the known of another knower. Yet the known in self-consciousness can merely be, what St. Augustine too has called, the will (volition) itself.
Let us consider the image of a plant as a symbol of Consciousness. It is comprised of the root and corona; the former reaches down into the darkness, moisture, and cold, while the latter goes up into brightness, dryness, and warmth, yet close to the ground they part from each other. The former is the original and perennial, whose death entails that too of the corona, and thus we call it the primary. The latter is which has sprouted forth and which can pass away without the root dying, so is thus secondary. The root represents the Wille, the corona the intellect, and the point of difference of the two would for us be the I or Ego.
The fundamental of all errors made by philosophers before Schopenhauer has been in attributing the accident into the substance. In doing so they have made Thinking the essential and primary element of man's inner being or spiritual life of the Soul, always putting it first, whereas willing is only made product of thinking, and as such, something additional and subsequent. Such a glaring error is made obvious if one can consider even the lowest of all the animals, in whom, the Wille is yet so often indomitable in spite of extremely limited knowledge. To not identify this incorrect first premise has led them to the pursuit of wrong paths with no exit. The consequence is reason why Philosophy has fallen into disrepute.
It is pertinent at this point to understand the role of the intellect vis-à-vis the Wille. The intellect is conditioned by the brain to respond adequately to the whims of the Wille. Keep in mind that the brain itself is simply the objectivity of the Thing-in-Itself, which for us, is the Wille; for the intellect generally turns out to be what is secondary and subordinate to it. In self-consciousness the Wille appears as the primary and immediate thing to always assert its pre-eminence over the intellect. This Wille is not essentially united with Consciousness, but is related to it, in other words, to knowledge, similarly as something illuminated to light. It comes into consciousness from within just as the corporeal world comes from without. The Intellect is as fleeting and is as perishable as is the brain, and is its activity foremost. Like the whole organism, the brain is the phenomenon, therefore a secondary thing of the Wille. Only the Wille is truly imperishable but in itself is without consciousness; the Wille is metaphysical, the intellect physical.
Consciousness itself is conditioned by the intellect, which is but an accident of our being, and acts as the primary function of the brain. The brain in all its complexity serves only the purpose of self-preservation by regulating the body's relations with the external world. Indeed this way the brain is in fact like a parasite attached to its host, where as the image brought about by its forms of knowledge is said to be extended and operative. The apprehension of the external world, thus, self-consciousness contains a knower and a known else consciousness of anything would not be possible. The knower himself, precisely so, cannot be known because he would otherwise be the known of another knower. Yet the known in self-consciousness can merely be, what St. Augustine too has called, the will (volition) itself.
Let us consider the image of a plant as a symbol of Consciousness. It is comprised of the root and corona; the former reaches down into the darkness, moisture, and cold, while the latter goes up into brightness, dryness, and warmth, yet close to the ground they part from each other. The former is the original and perennial, whose death entails that too of the corona, and thus we call it the primary. The latter is which has sprouted forth and which can pass away without the root dying, so is thus secondary. The root represents the Wille, the corona the intellect, and the point of difference of the two would for us be the I or Ego.
The fundamental of all errors made by philosophers before Schopenhauer has been in attributing the accident into the substance. In doing so they have made Thinking the essential and primary element of man's inner being or spiritual life of the Soul, always putting it first, whereas willing is only made product of thinking, and as such, something additional and subsequent. Such a glaring error is made obvious if one can consider even the lowest of all the animals, in whom, the Wille is yet so often indomitable in spite of extremely limited knowledge. To not identify this incorrect first premise has led them to the pursuit of wrong paths with no exit. The consequence is reason why Philosophy has fallen into disrepute.
